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Collaborative-based national cybersecurity incident management benefits from huge size of 
incident information, large-scale information security devices and aggregation of security 
skills. However, no existing collaborative approach has been able to cater for multiple 
regulators, divergent incident views and incident reputation trust issues that national 
cybersecurity incident management presents.  This paper proposes a collaborative approach to 
handle these issues cost-effectively.
Design/Methodology/Approach 
A collaborative-based national cybersecurity incident management architecture based on ITU-
T X.1056 security incide t management framework is proposed. It is composed of the 
cooperative regulatory unit with cooperative and third-party management strategies, and 
execution unit, with incident handling and response strategies. Novel collaborative incident 
prioritization and mitigation planning models that are fit for incident handling in national 
cybersecurity incident management are proposed. 
Findings
Use case depicting how the collaborative-based national cybersecurity incident management 
would function within a typical ICT ecosystem is illustrated.  The proposed collaborative 
approach is evaluated based on the performances of an experimental cyber-incident 
management system against two multistage attack scenarios.  The results show that the 
proposed approach is more reliable compared to the existing ones based on descriptive 
statistics.
Originality/Value
The approach produces better incident impact scores and rankings than standard tools. The 
approach reduces the total response costs by 8.33% and false positive rate by 97.20% for the 
first attack scenario, while it reduces the total response costs by 26.67% and false positive rate 
by 78.83% for the second attack scenario.
Keywords: Incident management, national cybersecurity, information security management, 
collaborative approach, incident handling and response


































































Globally, attackers have evolved sophisticated methods, which have made cyber-attacks 
difficult to combat. The 2018 threat report by Symantec Enterprise Security (Symantec, 2019) 
showed that the level of targeted, form-jacking, IoT, ransomware, cloud and election 
interference attacks have risen more than previous years. Thus, more effort is needed in security 
management to avert the losses in information systems and assets. 
According to Ntouskas et al. (2011), security management is a continuous and systematic 
process of identifying, analysing, handling, reporting and monitoring operational risk of an 
organisation, while threat management is central to it (SensePost, 2011). The core objective of 
information security management is to implement the appropriate measurements to eliminate 
or minimize the impacts of threats such as incident and vulnerabilities in the organization. 
Different information security management system specifications exist such as ISO/IEC 
27000, ISO/IEC 27001, and ISO/IEC 27002. Both ITU-T and ISO/IEC jointly developed 
recommendation ITU-T X.1051(information technology, security techniques and information 
security management guidelines for telecommunications organizations based on ISO/IEC 
27002), which establishes guidelines and general principles for information security 
management in telecommunications organizations. The standard is composed of other 
standards like ITU-T X.1056, which focuses on security incident management guidelines. 
Security incident management involves incident handling and response services that help 
prevent incidents (Alberts et al., 2004). The incident handling services include detection and 
reporting of incidents, correlation, categorization, prioritization, and assignment of events, and 
mitigation planning steps. The incident response involves the actions taken to resolve or 
mitigate an incident, coordinate and disseminate information, and implement follow-up 
strategies. 
Fighting security threats with only a local view is inherently difficult. Seigneur and Slagell 
(2009) briefly described collaborative security as: “instead of centrally managed security 
policies, nodes may use specific knowledge (both local and acquired from other nodes) to make 
security-related decisions”. The decisions must happen in a community in which nodes can 
contribute their efforts to make the decisions more effectively and reasonably. Nodes should 
collaborate with each other by sharing some information, analysis results and security related 
decisions. Collaborative security management system is therefore a joint effort between 
multiple security management systems. 
Sharing of relevant incident information intelligence among multiple security management 
systems facilitates detection and prevention of large-scale cyberattacks in cost-effective 
manner across different collaborative security management systems (Staniford et al., 2002). 
However, issues such as synergy, trust, standardization, analysis, and control must be addressed 
(Saklikar, 2013)
The different levels of collaborative security management include system-level security 
incident management (S-SIM) (Chen et al., 2007; Chen, et al. 2013), organizational-level 
security incident management (O-SIM) (Ntoukas et al., 2011; Pan et al., 2016) and national-
level security incident management (N-SIM) (Settanni et al., 2017). S-SIM involves 
collaboration among computers and devices in single organization. It may involve single or 
multiple security managers, homogeneous or heterogeneous devices and an organizational 
security policy; O-SIM involves collaboration among security domains in a federated 
organization, with many partner organizations that share similar functions (Ntoukas et al., 
2011). Each organization in the federation has one or more security manager and information 
security devices. N-SIM involves a chain of collaboration among individuals, organizations 
and regulators within a country, region, or continent, which in many cases involves multiple 
regulators, heterogeneous devices, varying functions, and divergent incident views. While S-

































































SIM and O-SIM may have the capability to pay attention to significant incidents (Weiss, 2015), 
N-SIM can provide better regulation, in-depth incident analysis and be made to pay attention 
to significant incidents through prioritization of incidents based on their impacts at the S-SIM 
and O-SIM levels and interdependencies (Settanni et al., 2017). Therefore, N-SIM will be very 
beneficial to systems and organizations, most especially connected infrastructures. According 
to a PwC report, a successful cyber-attack on a telecommunications operator could disrupt 
service for thousands of phone customers, internet service for millions of consumers, cripple 
businesses, and shut down government operations (Lobel, 2014).
In concordance with the existing national cybersecurity incident management 
recommendations such as ENISA (2013), European Commission (2016), NIST (2018), and GC 
CSEMP (2018), this paper proposes an improved collaborative approach for national 
cybersecurity incident management.  
2. National Cybersecurity Incident Management 
National cybersecurity incident management enables the collection and processing of incident-
related information most especially interdependent services and shared resources in global 
contexts (Amanowicz, 2020). It enables exchange of information, experience, and security 
devices, which lead to information heterogeneity, divergent incident views and incident 
reputation trust issues. In some cases, the challenges may be complicated by multiple 
regulations and conflicting guidelines. 
Several standards, which support collaborative incident management have been developed 
to provide frameworks for sharing cybersecurity incident information. RFC 7970 Incident 
Object Description Exchange Format (IODEF) (Danyliw et al., 2007) was developed as a 
legacy format for exchanging incident information. The problem with the framework is that it 
does not cater for integration of relevant information that are related to vulnerability, weakness, 
information security device and configuration updates. RFC 7203 IODEF for Structured Cyber 
Security Information (IODEF-SCI) (Takahashi, 2013) was developed as an extension to 
IODEF to cater for the missing information.  
Other frameworks include RFC 6045 Real-time Inter-network Defense (RID) (Moriarty, 
2012), which outlines a proactive inter-network communication method to facilitate sharing of 
incident data while integrating existing detection, tracing, source identification, and mitigation 
mechanisms. This provides a way to achieve higher security levels on networks. RID functions 
via request, acknowledgement, result, report, and query message types. MITRE Standards 
(Farnham, 2013) such as CybOX, STIX, TAXII were also developed. Cyber observable 
expression (CybOX) provides a standard for defining indicator details known as observables; 
structured threat information expression (STIX) provides a standard to define patterns of 
observables in context while trusted automated exchange of indicator information (TAXII) 
provides a standard to exchange cyber threat intelligence. 
These standards have been applied to N-SIM in Settanni et al. (2017), which proposed a 
collaborative cyber-incident management system for European interconnected critical 
infrastructures based on the European cyber-security operation centres (SOCs). The national-
level SOCs were responsible for correlating the security-related data, analysing, and providing 
support and mitigation strategies to organizational-level SOCs. Single national-level SOC was 
proposed for each substituent unit (country). The data collection and cross-SOC information 
exchange activities in the system were organized into data collection, data fusion,  data sharing, 
data encryption and trust, collaboration while feature extraction and analysis was organized 
into incident system component and analysis model, with information entities, artefact 
extraction and resource linking. Other aspects of the system included incident visualization and 
mitigation. The incident handling process did not provide any mechanism for addressing the 

































































incident reputation trust issue and show how the divergent views of incidents were aggregated.  
The system was evaluated with cyber-physical attack scenario on gas supply, but the outcomes 
were not presented. Common cybersecurity awareness of critical infrastructure was presented 
in Puuska et al. (2018). They designed a common operating picture system to monitor large-
scale critical infrastructures. Joint Directors of Laboratories (JDL) data were fused to integrate 
different critical infrastructure systems with their dependency relations. This allowed for 
situational awareness of critical infrastructure and networks. Five levels of processes involving 
different JDL were performed such as pre-processing, object refinement, situation refinement, 
threat refinement, process refinement and cognitive refinement to predict the performance 
levels of operators.   
Some other collaborative-based incident handling and response systems, which have 
functioned as O-SIM and S-SIM include Sequoia, a robust communication architecture for 
distributed internet-scale security monitoring systems, proposed by Kang et al. (2004). Sequoia 
supported regional and global sharing of monitored observations, collaborative decision-
making among monitors, and timely delivery of security information to monitors. The system 
relied on certificate-based routing to ensure trust among parties. Sequoia’s architecture 
supported aggregation, integration, and dissemination of blacklists using a publisher-subscriber 
paradigm. Sequoia comprised three key protocols: the monitor neighbour discovery protocol 
(MND) for topology-aware flat overlay among monitors to allow connection to nearby 
nodes(neighbours); distributed dominator selection protocol (DDS) that ensured that monitors 
met minimum requirements regarding trustworthiness and routing performance and the 
communication path discovery protocol (CPD) for discovering multiple delivery paths among 
nodes. Ullrich (2004) presented DShield, which aggregated firewall and intrusion detection 
system logs from global Internet. Each log entry representing one or more packets that violated 
a local rule was normalized. The entry included: time-detected, submitter’s ID, count, source 
IP, source port, destination IP, destination p rt, protocol exploited, and flags. Ntoukas et al. 
(2011) proposed a collaborative network security management platform called Storm to 
improve security in distributed and complex information systems with critical data and 
services. The platform made use of advanced open source technologies and interactive software 
tools. The tool was applied to a port information system security and the results show the 
effectiveness of collaborative network security management in the distributed system. Chen et 
al. (2013) proposed a collaborative unified threat management system to mitigate botnets. The 
system consisted an effective collaborative unified threat management (UTM) and traffic 
probers. A distributed security overlay network with a centralized security centre leveraged by 
a peer-to-peer communication protocol was used in the UTM collaborative module. The 
security functions for the UTM were retrofitted to share security rules. A cloud-based security 
centre was used for network security forensic analysis. The cloud storage kept collected traffic 
data and enabled processing of data with cloud computing platforms to find the malicious 
attacks. Chen et al. (2014) proposed an architecture, mechanism design and system 
implementation of vCNSMS, a collaborative network security prototype system in multiple 
tenant’s data centre network. The work demonstrated vCNSMS with a centralized collaborative 
scheme and deep packet security check. A security level-based protection policy was proposed 
for simplifying the security rule management for vCNSMS. 
Pan et al. (2016) introduced HogMap, a novel software-defined network (SDN) 
infrastructure that simplified and incentivized collaborative measurement and monitoring of 
cyber-threat activity. HogMap integrated several novel SDN-enabled capabilities such as 
intelligent in-place filtering of malicious traffic, dynamic migration of interesting and 
extraordinary traffic and a software-defined marketplace where various parties can 
opportunistically subscribe to and publish cyber-threat intelligence services in a flexible 
manner. The system was implemented as SDN-based HoneyGrid, which spans traffic filtering, 

































































traffic forwarding and connection migration. The result showed that SDN technologies greatly 
simplify the design and deployment of such globally distributed and elastic HoneyGrids. Wu 
and Wang (2018) developed a consensus protocol to implement the information sharing and 
fusion in a collaborative manner with the objective of achieving the maximum security for IoT 
systems. A game theoretical analysis framework was employed for the collaborative security 
detection by considering the confrontation between the defender and the attacker. The existence 
and uniqueness of the Nash equilibrium of game model with complete consensus were 
analysed. Then an iteration learning based calculation method was presented to determine the 
Nash equilibrium. Quantitative analysis was provided for the relationship between the Nash 
equilibriums of the game models in the cases of complete and incomplete consensus with 
infinite and finite number of iterations.
The review has shown that no collaborative-based national cybersecurity incident 
management system has addressed synergy, trust, standardization, analysis, and control in 
scenarios with multiple regulatory frameworks, heterogeneous devices, divergent incident 
views and incident reputation trust requirement. 
Our work is therefore different from existing works based on the following contributions:
 creation of a collaborative framework for national security incident management, with 
multiple regulators
 provision of models to handle regulation conflicts among N-SIM regulators,
 development of trust-based multi-perspective incident handling and response models, 
 provision of security incident management use cases for typical national cybersecurity. 
 performance evaluation of the proposed national security incident management 
approach.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: Section 3 presents and describes the 
collaborative framework of national security incident management; Section 4 presents the 
models for the incident handling and response tasks; Section 5 presents the performance 
evaluation based of attack scenarios and surveys. Section 6 presents the use cases for the 
application of national cybersecurity incident management in Nigeria ICT ecosystem. The 
paper is concluded in Section 7.
3. Collaborative Framework for National Security Incident Management
In Figure 1, we present the framework of national security incident management, which is 
based on ITU-T X.1056 (Security Incident Management Guidelines for Telecommunications 
Organizations) because of its robustness in handling different cybersecurity incident 
management standards. The system consists National Control Unit (NC) with different 
abstractions and Security Incident Management Execution Unit (SIME). 
                   
Fig. 1. National Security Incident Management Framework
3.1 National Control Unit
The NC is composed of national security managers (security managers), different sets of 
regulatory guidelines and incident report monitor. Each security manager ensures that the 
incident security management guidelines of his regulatory agency is adhere to. The guidelines 
are made up of different rules for ensuring trust, synergy, policy compliance, standards, prompt 
analysis of incidents, recommendation of mitigation strategies and review of actions. The 
following strategies ensure the guidelines are not violated.
a. Cooperative Management Strategy: All the security managers are involved in the 
enforcement of trust and synergy, enforcement of policies and standards, analysis of incidents, 

































































recommendation of mitigation strategies and review of actions. The shared key encryption 
scheme ensures that no individual or part of the security managers have full access control over 
the incident management process. 
b. Third Party Management Strategy: A third-party auditor monitors and reviews all the 
activities of the security managers to ensure compliance with guidelines. He resolves regulation 
conflicts among the national security managers when there is breach at the cooperative 
management level. 
The security managers aggregate the different views of the incident submitted by the S-SIM, 
O-SIM, and N-SIM which can be accessed via the incident report monitor. The N-SIM operator 
is in-charge of the data centre infrastructure; he updates the security managers about detected 
incidents.  When a security manager observes a request alert at the monitor, he communicates 
with the other security managers to be able to decrypt the alert since the message can only be 
decrypted through shared key. The data is saved in encrypted format, which can only be 
decrypted using shared keys owned by the security managers using encryption scheme such as 
SunScreen SKIP (Oracle, 2010). Upon completion of incident response, the information is 
encrypted based on Attribute-based Encryption (Bethencourt et al., 2007). Figure 2 illustrates 
the interaction among the components in the national control unit.
Fig. 2: National Control Unit
The incident views could be organized into five different levels of abstractions such as:
a. operator-level view, which is the highest level of abstraction. At this level, the profile 
of the participant security operator is known.
b. system-level view, which is the next lower level to the operator-level. At the level, the 
structural and some basic functional details of the information system is viewed. 
c. asset-level view, which is the next lower level to the system-level. At this level, the 
details of the functions, services, and connectivity as well as updates of the components 
are viewed.
d. vulnerability-level view, which is next to the asset-level gives the details of flaws and 
threats that might likely violate the assets.
e. attack-level view, which is the lowest level of abstraction. At this level, the most 
probable paths of attacks given sets of mitigation measures can be observed.
3.2 Security Incident Management Execution Unit
The SIME has two components, which are the data centre and security incident management 
decisions components.  The incident-related information is stored in the data centre using RFC 
7203 IODEF-SCI (Takashi, 2013) template, because it provides detail incident-related 
information and it is cross-platform. Unstructured incidents-related information in text format 
can be submitted by the S-SIM, O-SIM and N-SIM operators but they are converted to a 
structured format by using natural language processing techniques to identify the incident and 
other information. The first step is to pre-process the texts using NLTK packages (Bird and  
Kliein, 2009), extract the n-gram weighted by term frequency inverse document format 
(Gaydhani et al., 2018) and classify the data using Scikit learn packages (Pedregosa et al., 
2011). The data template for the incident-related information is presented in Table 1. 
Table 1. Structured of Incident-related Information
The security incident management process lifecycle presented in Figure 3 involves the 
following incident handling and response steps:

































































a. Task Review: At this point, incident requests are reviewed at the beginning of security 
incident management, while recommendations are reviewed at the end of the process 
against the guidelines. 
b. Incident Preparation: The incident features required for the subsequent stages are 
transformed to their usable format. 
c. Incident Categorization and Correlation: This involves aggregation of incidents from 
different sensors and operators, with different incident names and incident 
reconstruction usually involving multi-step correlation to understand the attack 
patterns. 
d. Incident Prioritization: The rating of the incident based on certain indices and 
computation. 
e. Incident Assignment: The ranking of the incident according to their impacts and risks 
to systems at S-SIM, O-SIM and N-SIM such as {1, 2,3, …, N} or {Very Low, Low, 
Medium, High, …, M} 
f. Mitigation Planning: Cost-effective mitigation and recovery response strategy are 
recommended against the attacks.
g. Incident Response: Cost-effective mitigation and recovery actions are implemented, 
and the performance is evaluated.
Fig. 3. Security Incident Management Process Lifecycle
4. Incident Handling and Response Strategies
The following models are used to carry out the incident handling and response steps:
4.1 Incident Categorization and Correlation
In this phase, the new incidents are reviewed, prepared, and categorized by aggregating them 
with existing incidents in the data centre and observing the attack patterns. If the incident has 
not been reported before, correlation take place using effective alert correlation strategy.      
Several alert correlation strategies exist. Bayesian networks was used in Jemili et al. (2009), 
while Probabilistic Hidden Markov Model (HMM) in Haslum (2010). Data mining techniques 
were used for predictive attack plan recognition and intrusion prediction in Li et al. (2007), 
while it was combined with HMM in Farhadani et al. (2011). Because of the incompleteness 
and assumptions in Bayesian Networks and HMM and the incremental large volume of the 
incidents, the sequential association mining of Li et al. (2007) was adapted for the correlation. 
However, rather than using only incident name to define incident, the trio of incident_name, 
source_IP and dest_IP address are used. Other features such as source_port, dest_ports, 
protocols, incident_ID are removed. The incidents are sorted in order of detect_time. 
The average detection time is chosen as the window size. The Sequential Association 
Mining algorithms presented below are used to generate candidate attack sequences and 
interesting attack patterns, respectively. 
         
CANDIDATE_SEQUENCE (Windowstep, Sequence)
// Generate every sequence of attack pattern
Step 1: Set WindowSize to P, SequenceSize to 1
Step 2: MaximumSequence Size to L, Sequence to empty, MaxIncidentSize to N
Step 3: Sort incidents based on their timestamps.

































































Step 4: Set the current WindowStep to 1 
Step 5: Set Temp to empty, Set Incident Size 
Step 6: IF IncidentSize < N 
Step 5: IF WindowSize < L
Step 7: Increment SequenceSize by 1
Step 8:   Add incident to Temp
Step 9: ENDIF
Step10: Add Temp to Sequence
Step11: Return WindowStep, Sequence
Step12: ENDIF
INTERESTING_SEQUENCE (Sequence)
//To find the interesting attack sequences 
Step 13: Set WindowStep to 1, Threshold to T, Set TempLocation to 0, Temp to empty, 
InterestingSequence to empty
Step 14: Assign MinimumSupport to MinSup, WindowStep to Max
Step 15: IF WindowStep < Max 
Step 16: Increment the WindowStep
Step 17: Add Sequence to Temp 
Step 18: IF TempLocation != Temp
Step 19: Increment the TempLocation
Step 20: Compute the Support in Temp
Step 21: IF Support ≥ MinSup
Step 22: Compute the Confidence in Temp 
Step 23: IF Confidence =1              
Step 23: InterestingSequence ← Sequence
Step 24: ENDIF
Step 25: ENDIF
Step 24: Return Sequence
Step 25: ENDIF
Step 26: ENDIF
The support and confidence are estimated using the formulae below:
Support (B) =  (1)
𝑛(𝐴 ∩ 𝐵)
𝑁




A is known as Antecedent and B is known as Consequent.
N is the number of incidents 
n (AՈB) is the number of times A and B occurs together as sequence in the sequence 
table such that A is the antecedent and B is the consequent.
n (A) is the number of times the antecedent A occurs.
Based on the assumption that a once successful attack exploit would be exploited by an attacker 
in the near future than a none successful one; only the longest attack sequence (interesting 
attack pattarns), in which each step(stage) has confidence of 1(sequence that occur three times) 
are chosen to determine the actionable threat paths since the attack was replayed  three times.
 


































































Several incident prioritization strategies have been developed such as Caswell and Roesh 
(1998), Porras et al. (2002), Lee and Qin (2003), Alsubhi et al. (2008), Dondo (2008), Mell et 
al. (2009)  and Jumaat (2012). The only collaborative-based incident prioritization strategy was 
Yu et al. (2004) developed for multiple IDS products. It combined intelligent agents and 
knowledge-based alert evaluation system. They evaluated the alert priority based on asset 
characteristics; however, the strategy neither considered the reputation of the incidents nor 
made provision for task review. 
4.2.1 Incident Reputation Handling
Apart from encryption-based privacy, incident reputation is important in the estimation of the 
impact of incidents. The security managers critically examine the level of reputation of the 
participant security operators, communication media, information security devices and other 
incident sources based on trust in compliance with ITU-T Y.3052 (Overview of trust 
provisioning in information and communication technology infrastructures and services) and 
apply it to prioritization of incidents. 
In social science research, integrity, ability, benevolence and trust propensity have been 
proven to be indicators of trust among human beings (Kee and Knox, 1970; Barber, 1983; 
Butler, 1991 and Mayer et al., 1995). The communication media reputation depends on 
confidentiality, integrity and availability (Whitman and Mattord, 2004), while the trust of a 
data source depends on reliability, integrity and comprehensibility of the Information provided 
(Hu and Yang-Li, 2007; Nath et al., 2010). In this study therefore, we evaluate trust based on 
integrity, ability, benevolence and trust propensity indices for security operators; 
confidentiality, integrity and availability indices for communication media; and integrity, 
comprehensibility and reliability for incident-related data sources. Table 2 presents the trust 
classes with the indicators and their descriptions.
Table 2: Trust Classes, Indicators and their Descriptions
We define trust, T as the measure of belief for incident, x and mass function (Mj) as the sum 
of the measures of the indicators (di) as presented in (3)-(5). 
Mj = i   (3)∑
10
𝑖 = 1𝑑 
since the indicators are 10.
Where      0≤ M ≤ 1 (4)
And  0 ≤ di ≤ 0.1 (5)
To combine the mass function, rules of combinations such as sum, product, average, tan-h, 
Rough Set, Fuzzy Set or Bayesian rules could have been used. However, they equire scores 
or probabilities for each question of interest which are not actualisable in network security 
field, in which many information are collected through indirect means. Dempster-Shafer 
method is used to obtain degrees of belief of one evidence from subjective probabilities for a 
data source. The Dempster-Shafer theory of belief function is a generalization of the Bayesian 
theory of subjective probability(Shafer, 1976). The advantage over Bayesian Theory is that the 
degrees of belief for one question can be based on the probabilities for a related question.  The 
Dempster-Shafer theory consists of hypotheses, pieces of evidence and data sources. The 
hypotheses represent all the possible states (evidence assignments). It is required that all 

































































hypotheses are elements (singletons) of the frame of discernment, which is given by the finite 
universal set Ω. The set of all subsets of Ω is its power set 2 Ω.  The pieces of evidence are the 
qualitative scores or observations, which may occur within a system. 
The measure of Belief is derived from the combined basic assignments of the mass function 
(M). In this task, the Dempster’s Rule (Shafer, 1976) that combines multiple belief functions 
through their basic probability assignments is used. These belief functions are defined on the 
same frame of discernment based on independent arguments or bodies of evidence. The 
Dempster’s Rule of combination is purely a conjunctive operation (AND). Specifically, the 
combination (called the joint M12…n) is calculated from the aggregation of probability 
assignment functions M1, M2, …, Mn as presented in (6)-(10). The numerator represents the 
accumulated evidence for the sets B, C, …, Z, which supports the hypothesis A, and the 
denominator is the sum of the amount of conflict among the sets. 
T (x) =         M12...n(A)    (6)      
When     A  ; (7)≠ ∅
 
and  M12…n( ) = O (8)∅
M12...n(A) =        (9)
∑
𝐵 ∩ 𝐶… ∩ 𝑍 = 𝐴𝑀1(𝐵)𝑀2(𝐶)…𝑀𝑛 (𝑍)
1 ― 𝐾
K = (10)∑𝐵 ∩ 𝐶… ∩ 𝑍 = ∅𝑀1(𝐵)𝑀2(𝐶)…𝑀𝑛 (𝑍)
where B, C, A C A. M are the mass functions. A is the hypothesis. 
4.2.2 Impact of Incidents
Because impact of incident depends on the attack capability and victim vulnerability, 
attacker and victim-based intrusion perspectives (McHugh et al., 2001) are used to model 
incident for in-depth analysis of incidents. Table 3 indicates the attacker’s perspectives, the 
criteria considered in the perspectives and how the criteria are assessed, while Table 4 indicates 
the victim’s perspectives, the criteria considered in the perspectives and how the criteria are 
assessed. The criteria are assessed on 1-to-3 scale. The attacker-based perspectives are based 
on how the attacker would view the vulnerable system, while the victim-based perspectives are 
based on how the victim would view the attack. We combine both perspectives to prioritize or 
estimate the impact of incidents in systems.
Table 3: Attacker-centric Perspectives, Criteria and Scales
Table 4: Victim-centric Perspectives, Criteria and Scales
The impact of an incident is evaluated using the perception scores weighted by trust as 
presented in (11)-(18). The following steps are followed.
4.2.2.1 Trust Normalization
The maximum trust for threat, x for the criteria is normalized so that the sum is equal to 1.





































































Where Tk = Max (T(x)) (12)
4.2.2.2 Expected Value for each incident perspective
The expected value for incident perspective (E) is the weighted sum of the products of trust 
(Tk) and perspective score (Sk) 
                  





       When  = 1; (14)∑𝑐𝑘 = 1𝑇𝑘
E(P) = (15)∑𝑐𝑘 = 1𝑇𝑘𝑆𝑘
4.2.2.3 Impact of Incident
The impact of an incident for attacker’s perspective (RA) is the sum of the expected values for 
all the attacker’s incident perspectives divided by asset ranking in terms of importance (Q).





Where 1 ≤ m ≤ 3 (m is attacker’s perspectives)  
The impact of an incident for victim’s perspective (Rv) is the sum of the expected values for 
all the victim’s





Where 4 ≤ n ≤ 6 (n is victim’s perspectives)
1 ≤ Q ≤ L (The highest Q is 1 and the lowest is L)
                  
The impact of incident (R(x)) is the sum of impact for attacker’s perspective and victim’s 
perspective for incident, x.
Thus, R(x) = RA + RV (18)
4.2.3 Incident Assignment
The incident with impact scores, R that are above Rz (R>Rz) are classified as high; those 
below Rz but greater or equal to Ry (Rz  > R ≥ Ry) are medium; those below Ry but greater or 
equal to Rx (Ry  > R ≥ Rx) are low; and those below Rx are very low. Also, an incident is 
ranked high when the incident has no impact score.  
4.2.4 Mitigation Planning

































































Hillson (1999) Risk Control Strategy is adapted in this study because of its popular usage and 
effectiveness.   The strategies are presented as follows with its flowchart in Figure 4.
a.Avoid: The action to be taken is to enable both detection and prevention layer.
b.Transfer: The action to be taken is to improve detection and prevention layer capability
c.Mitigate: The action to be taken is to enable detection layer and disable prevention 
layer.
d.Accept: The action to be taken is to disable detection and prevention layers.
Fig 4. Syste  Flow Chart for Mitigation Planning
4.2.5 Incident Response 
At this stage, the incident response actions are taken, and the performance is evaluated based
on response cost and benefit.  The incident response model is a seven-tuple (X, D, P, M, A, 
C, B) where: 
X:  a finite set of t incidents, X= {x1, x2,…,xt} subject to M = {M1, M2, M3, M4}. 
D:  a finite set of n assets (d1, d2, …, dn) at the S-SIM, O-SIM and N-SIM levels. 
P:  a finite set of active u assets (p1, p2, …, pu) for active S-SIM, O-SIM and N-SIM.
M: a finite set of w enabled security options (m1, m2, …, mw) at the S-SIM, O-SIM and N-
SIM levels.
A: incident assignment shows the rank of the incidents. It includes very low, low, medium 
and high.
C: response cost is sum of the cost of avoidance, transfer, mitigation and acceptance. The cost 
factor in USD per threat for avoidance is set at 40USD, transfer is set at 30USD, 
mitigation is set at 20USD, while acceptance is set at 10USD.
B: incident response benefit is the overall impact of response actions on the incidents, which 
can be based on false positive rate, detection rate, accuracy, f1-score, etc.
5. Performance Evaluation of the Collaborative Approach
The proposed collaborative approach was evaluated based on the performances of an 
experimental cyber-incident management system against two multistage attack scenarios.
5.1 Cyber-incident Management System’s Testbed
The cybersecurity incident management system’s testbed is depicted in Figure 5. The testbed 
consisted routers and switches as well as firewall, network and host-based intrusion detection 
systems, which were operated by N-SIM operators.  At each O-SIM (SP), firewall, network 
and host-based intrusion detection systems were installed. The O-SIM network operated over 
four subnets: 10.1.0.128/27, 10.1.0.160/27, 10.1.0.192/27 and 10.1.0.224/27 each managed by 
an O-SIM operator. 
 
Fig. 5: Structure of the cyber-incident management system’s testbed 
5.2 Attack Scenarios
Two multistage attacks were used to evaluate the proposed approach. 
5.2.1 First Attack Scenario

































































We set up an attack targeted at CVE-2012-4681(NVD, 2012) against four O-SIM, one of which 
consisted three S-SIM, with Java Runtime Environment (JRE) component in Oracle Java SE 7 
Update 6. The four phases of the attack scenario are as follows:
a. Connect to the Victims 
b. Scan the operating systems for exploitable vulnerability 
c. Attempt to exploit CVE-2012-4681 
d. Exploit CVE-2012-4681
The incident alerts of the sensors for the attacks were monitored at the O-SIM level through 
incident monitoring tools. Figure 6 indicates some instances of the intrusion detection system 
alerts for the first attack scenario as observed at the O-SIM operator level through Security 
Onion (Burks, 2014). The alerts and other information were submitted to the data centre 
through different communication media. After analysis of the report by the security managers, 
other incident information related to the vulnerability previously in the data centre were fused 
with the incidents using natural language processing technique (Settani et al., 2017).
Fig. 6. Sample Alerts
The following sequence of incidents, which reflect the attack stages for first attack scenario 
as generated from incident categorization and correlation process is presented in Table 5. The 
result showed that only a host (10.1.0.135) was successfully attacked. 
Table 5: Attack Stages for First Attack Scenario
5.2.2 Second Attack Scenario
In order to benchmark the model, the publicly available LLDOS 1.0 Inside exploits in four 
critical subnets: 172.16.112.0/24, 172.16.113.0/24, 172.16.114.0/24 and 172.16.115.0/24  
(LLDOS 1.0, 2000) created by MIT Lincoln Lab in 2000 were filtered and merged with 
DARPA 1999 (LLDOS 1.0, 2000) background data collected on Monday of the first week. The 
five phases of the attack scenario are as follows:
a. IPsweep of the AFB from a remote site 
b. Probe of live IP's to look for the sadmind daemon running on Solaris hosts 
c. Breakins via the sadmind vulnerability, both successful and unsuccessful on those hosts 
d. Installation of the trojan mstream DDoS software on three hosts at the AFB 
e. Launching the DDoS
 
The incident alerts of the sensors for the attacks were monitored at the O-SIM level through 
incident monitoring tools. The alerts and other information were submitted to the data centre 
through different communication media. After analysis of the report by the security managers, 
other incident information related to the vulnerability previously in the data centre were fused 
with the incidents using natural language processing technique.
The following sequence of incidents, which reflect the attack stages for LLDOS 1.0 Inside 
exploits as generated from incident categorization and correlation process is presented in Table 
6. This reflected the description in DARPA (2014). Different bots were applied at the 
reconnaissance IPsweep and scanning phases as shown in stage 1 and stage 2. It showed that 
after a successful exploit of sadmind vulnerability in a host 172. 16.115.20 of a particular 

































































subnet, the attacker performs pings host 172.16.113.204 in another subnet.  This conforms to 
the description in LLDOS 1.0 (2000)
Table 6: Attack Stages for Second Attack Scenario
To evaluate the incident prioritization model, we adopted the ranking scales of very low 
(A<5), low (8>A≥5), medium (12>A≥8) and high (A≥12) for the proposed N-SIM approach. 
However, the ranking scale for Snort (Caswell and Roesh, 1998) is from 1 (very low), 2 (low), 
3 (medium) and 4(high), while Common Vulnerability Scoring System (CVSS) (Mell et al., 
2009) is none (0), low (0.1-3.9), medium (4.0-6.9), high (7.0-8.9) and critical (9.0-10.0).
Table 7 and Table 8 present the outcomes of the incident prioritization model for the first 
and second attack scenarios, respectively compared to CVSS and Snort. Table 7 showed that 
for N-SIM, five incidents have low rank, while one incident has very low rank with varying 
scores, unlike Snort, which ranked all the incidents as low, with the same risk score of 2.  
CVSS, was worst with the score of 0 because all the incidents are not known to it.  Table 8 
shows that for N-SIM, seven incidents have very low ranks, one has low rank, three have 
medium ranks and one has high rank. N-SIM ranked incidents with or without CVE 
identification. In fact, four of the five incidents above very low rank have CVE-ID above high 
ranks, which signify the correctness of the proposed approach. Snort was poor having ranked 
IPsweep and probe exploits higher with medium ranks than break-in and DoS exploits, while 
CVSS was poor because it could rank only five incidents out of the twelve. Comparing the 
ranking of the proposed approach to the ranking of Snort using Spearman’s correlation, r = 
0.79 and p = 0.2 were obtained for first attack scenario, which showed that the ranking was 
positively significant at p>0.05. For second attack scenario, the results are r = -0.45 and p = 
0.16, which showed that the ranking were negatively significant compared to Snort. The 
negative correlation was due to the poor prioritization by Snort, which ranked IPsweep and 
Probe attack exploits high and high priority exploits low. The proposed approach reflected the 
attack description in LLDOS 1.0 (2000) based on the ranks. 
Table 7. Incident Prioritization Results for N-SIM Approach, CVSS, and Snort for First 
Attack Scenario
Table 8. Incident Prioritization Results for N-SIM Approach, CVSS, and Snort for 
Second Attack Scenario
In Table 9, the response cost for the first attack scenario based on the mitigation strategy 
showed that the proposed collaborative approach incurs the lowest cost of $110, followed by 
Snort with $120 and CVSS with $240. In Table 10, the response cost for the second attack 
scenario based on the mitigation strategy showed that the proposed collaborative approach 
incurs the lowest cost of $220, followed by Snort with $470 and CVSS with $300. Both tables 
show the response cost factors for the incidents and the total costs estimated as sum of response 
costs. Figure 7 and Figure 8 indicate the total response costs for the first and second attack 
scenario, respectively. In Figure 7, the proposed approach incurred lesser total response cost 
(cost ratio = 0.917, cost difference = -8.33%)  in comparison with Snort, unlike CVSS that 
doubles the cost (cost ratio =2, cost difference = +100%). In Figure 8, the proposed approach 
incurred lesser total response cost  (cost ratio = 0.733, cost difference = -26.67%) in comparison 
with Snort, unlike CVSS that almost doubles the cost (cost ratio = 1.567, cost difference = 
+56.67%). By replaying the attack against incident response configurations, the false positive 

































































rate reduced from 99.15% to 2.78% for the first attack scenario and 99.97 to 21.16% for the 
second attack scenario. 
Fig. 7. Total Response Cost for First Attack Scenario in Comparison with Snort
Fig. 8. Total Response Cost for Second Attack Scenario in Comparison with Snort
In Table 9, the performance comparison chart between the proposed N-SIM approach, Settani 
et al. (2017) and Puuska et al. (2018) is presented. The chart shows that the N-SIM approach 
is unique because it supports multiple regulators, divergent incident views and reputation trust, 
in comprehensive manner.
Table 9: Performance Comparison Chart for National Cybersecurity Incident 
Management Set-ups
6. Application to National Cybersecurity Platforms
6.1 The Nigerian ICT Ecosystem 
6.1.1 Background of the Nigerian Information and Communication Technology Sector
The Nigeria ICT ecosystem has over the years suffered from poor regulation and synergy 
(Omotoso and Muyiwa, 2016) at the regulatory and service provider level. The Nigeria ICT 
sector is dominated by mobile networks operators and its associated value-added services, the 
device sales and distribution, the equipment sales and distribution and software sales and 
distribution, which are regulated by Nigerian Communications Commission (NCC) and 
National Information Technology Development Agency (NITDA). 
The NCC is charged with the responsibility of regulating the supply of telecommunications 
services and facilities, promoting competition, and setting performance standards for 
telecommunication services in Nigeria (NCA Act, 2003), while NITDA statutorily develops 
regulations for electronic governance, monitoring of the use of information technology, 
electronic data interchange and other forms of electronic communication transactions  (NITDA 
Act, 2007). In 2015, NCC released strategic vision plan for the period between 2015 and 2020 
to provide comprehensive roadmap within the telecoms industry to promote innovation, 
investment, competition, consumer empowerment, and improve quality of service. However, 
much has not been achieved and there have been controversies about conflict in the regulations 
of NCC and NITDA (Elebeke, 2019). 
Presently, the Nigerian ICT market has moved from a decade of year-on-year growth, to a 
period of stagnation from poor policy and incentives, besides the subscription rate (Omotoso 
and Muyiwa, 2016). These have forced many investors out of market. Much as these problems 
exist, there is need to strengthen the operating environment in order to sustain the previous 
growth trajectory and encourage a robust digital economy. A key area to consider is 
improvement of cyber-security systems, which will help mitigate the loss. 
CBN-NEFF (2019) showed that electronic bank fraud cases in Nigeria have risen to 5.571 
billion naira from 2016 to 2018. The report showed that the major electronic channels used to 
perpetrate fraud were automated teller machines, point-of-sale and mobile platforms. However, 
Nigeria ICT ecosystem is confronted with inadequate information security devices, scarcity of 
skilled security managers and poor cyber-security management frameworks which have made 
the ICT sector susceptible to increased cyber-threats.


































































Based on the description with two regulators, national security incident management use case 
with two regulators is formulated for Nigeria ICT sector as follows:
6.1.2.1 National Control (NC)
The NC has telecommunication security manager, which is under the purview of NCC and 
electronic data security manager, which is under the purview of NITDA. The 
telecommunication security manager is responsible for ensuring telecommunication trust and 
synergy, compliance with telecommunication policy and standards, analysis of 
telecommunication incident and requests, offering of control and mitigation strategy advices 
on telecommunications and review of telecommunications aspects of security incident 
management execution actions. The electronic data security manager is responsible for 
ensuring electronic data (software) trust and synergy, compliance with data (software) policy 
and standards, analysis of software incident and requests, offering of control and mitigation 
strategy advices on electronic data (software)  and review of electronic data (software) aspects 
of security incident management execution actions. Both collect and aggregate the different 
views of the S-SIM, O-SIM and N-SIM. In any case of conflict, the Ministry of Communication 
and Digital Economy (MCDE) (Pantami, 2020) serves as the third-party auditor.
6.1.2.2 Security Incident Management Execution (SIME)
The data centre is built on network infrastructure connected to operator service providers 
(S-SIM) and two national security managers (NCC and NITDA). Figure 9 presents a feasible 
use case for the implementation of the requirements within the Nigeria ICT ecosystem.
Fig. 9. Use Case for Cybersecurity Incident Management in Nigerian ICT Ecosystem
7. Conclusion
In this paper, we have presented a collaborative approach for national cyber-security incident 
management that supports multiple regulatory systems. The approach addressed paucity of 
incident information, inadequate information security devices, scarcity of skilled security 
managers and limitations of the existing cyber-security incident management frameworks.  We 
formulated guidelines for integrating system, organizational and national security incident 
management domains based on ITU-T X.1056 with different views of incidents.  Conflict 
between regulators was handled by cooperative and third-party management strategies. 
Strategies for managing heterogeneity and diverse perspectives were also formulated. The 
incident privacy and reputation trust bottlenecks were addressed by proposing shared key 
encryption scheme and web-of-trust, which was based on standard trust indices. 
The collaborative approach was evaluated using two attack scenarios. A use case was also 
examined using Nigeria ICT ecosystem, with two ICT regulators as case study. The results 
showed that our approach is more realistic due to its dynamism, ability to prioritize known and 
unknown incidents. Furthermore, the response costs reduced by 8.33% and 26.67% for first 
and second attack scenarios, respectively and false positive reduced by 97.20% and 78.83%, 
respectively using Snort. Overall, the comparison of the proposed collaborative approach with 

































































existing approaches showed that the proposed approach was better in terms of in-depth 
analysis.    
In future, a national incident management system will be implemented in real-life based on 
the approach. The effectiveness of the system in handling conflicts and trusts will be evaluated 
empirically. 
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Fig. 1. National Security Incident Management Framework
































































Fig. 2: National Control Unit
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Fig. 5: Structure of the Data Centre Interconnectivity
































































Fig. 6. Sample Alerts
































































Fig. 7. Total Response Cost for First Attack Scenario in Comparison with Snort
































































Fig. 8. Total Response Cost for Second Attack Scenario in Comparison with Snort
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Table 1: Structured of Incident-related Information
S/N Category Feature Description
Incident_Name Popular name of the Incident
Incident_ID The ID assigned to this incident 
Alternative_ID The ID numbers used by other sources 
to refer to the incident described in the 
document
Related Activity The ID numbers of the incidents linked 
to the one described in this document
Start_Time Time at which the incident started.
End_Time Time at which the incident ended.
Detect_Time Time at which the incident was first 
detected
Report Time The time the incident was reported
Source_Port  The traced port where incident 
originate
Source_IP The traced IP where incident originate
Dest_Port The victim’s port
1 Incident
Dest_IP The victim’s IP
Asset Name of the server or package
Asset Category Category of the Asset
InfoSec Name of Information Security Products
2 System Data
InfoSec Configuration Configuration of InfoSec device
Vulnerability Asset Vulnerability Information3 Vulnerability 
Sources Weakness Asset Weakness Information
Contact Contact Address of Operator 
History  A log of the events or the significant 
actions which took place during the 
incident management.
4 User
Additional Information Mechanism which extends the data 
model.
































































Table 2: Trust Classes, Indicators and their Descriptions
Classes Indicators Description Value
1.  Integrity It is defined as the extent to 
which a trustee is believed to 
adhere to ethical principles. 
0 to 0.1
2. Ability It captures the “can-do” 
component of trustworthiness 
by describing whether the 
trustee has the skills needed to 
act in an appropriate fashion. 
0 to 0.1
3. Benevolence It is the extent to which a 
trustee is believed to want to 
do good for the trustor. 
0 to 0.1
S-SIM & O-SIM 
operators
4. Trust_Propensity It is the dispositional trust that 
is associated to what the actor 
‘will do’ instead of ‘can do’. 
0 to 0.1
5. Confidentiality It measures the state of contact 
medium in ensuring that only 
those with sufficient privileges 
and demonstrated need access 
certain information. 
0 to 0.1





7. Availability It measures the state of contact 
medium in ensuring 
uninterrupted user access. 
0 to 0.1
8. Integrity This is the measure of the 
condition of data source to 
produce the right output.  
0 to 0.1
9. Comprehension This is the measure of the 










10. Reliability This is the measure of the 
condition of data source to 
always produce the right 
output. 
0 to 0.1
































































Table 3: Attacker-centric Perspectives, Criteria and Scales







Exploit Availability Unavailable Scarce ReadilyExploitability
Ease of Exploitation Expert Trained Novice
Discoverability Year Month DayRisk of 




Integrity Impact None Partial Fully
Damage
Availability Impact None Partial Fully
































































Table 4: Victim-centric Perspectives, Criteria and Scales







Security Device 1 Low Moderate High
Security Device 2 Low Moderate High
. . . … … …
Frequency
Security Device N Low Moderate High
Security Device 1 Low Moderate High
Security Device 2 Low Moderate High




Security Device N Low Moderate High
Security Device 1 Low Moderate High
Security Device 2 Low Moderate High
. . . … … …
Severity
Security Device N Low Moderate High
































































Table 5: Attack Stages for First Attack Scenario
Stage Host Attack
1 10.1.0.135 Current_Events Possible Metasploit Java Exploit
2 10.1.0.197 Trojan Metasploit Meterpreter 
Core_Channel_Command Request
3 10.1.0.135 Trojan Metasploit Meterpreter stdapi_Command 
Request
4 10.1.0.135 Current_Events landing page with malicious Java 
Applet 
5 10.1.0.135 Current_Events Possible Metasploit Java Payload 
6 10.1.0.135 Info Java_Java Archive Download by Vulnerable 
Clients  
































































Table 6: Attack Stages for Second Attack Scenario
Stage Host Attack 
1 172.16.113.105 INFO PING NIX
2 172.16.113.105 INFO PING BSD type
3 172.16.114.169 INFO PING NIX
4 172.16.114.169 INFO PING BSD type
5 172.16.112.207 POLICY PE EXE/DLL Windows File 
Download
6 172.16.112.20 Exploit MS_SQL DOS ATTEMPT (08)
7 172.16.112.100 NETBIOS NT NULL Session
8 172.16.112.100 NETBIOS NT NULL Session
9 172.16.112.105 SNMP Public Access UDP
10 172.16.115.20 RPC PORTMAP SADMIND REQUEST 
UDP
11 172.16.115.20 RPC Sadmind query with root credentials
12 172.16.113.204 ICMP PING NIX
































































Table 7: Incident Prioritization Results for N-SIM Approach, CVSS, and Snort for First 
Attack Scenario
S/N Incident N-SIM CVSS Snort 
1 Current_events Possible Metasploit Java 
Exploit 
6.50 (Low) (None) 2 (Low)
2 Trojan Metasploit Meterpreter 
core_channel Command Request 
4.04 (Very Low) (None) 2 (Low)
3 Trojan Metasploit Meterpreter 
stdapi_command Request 
6.00 (Low) (None) 2 (Low)
4 Current_events landing page with malicious 
Java Applet 
5.00 (Low) (None) 2 (Low)
5 Current_events Possible Metasploit Java 
Payload 
5.50(Low) (None) 2 (Low)
6 Info Java_Java Archive Download by 
Vulnerable Clients  
5.50 (Low) (None) 2 (Low)
































































Table 8: Incident Prioritization Results for N-SIM Approach, CVSS, and Snort for Second 
Attack Scenario
S/N Incident N-SIM CVSS Snort 
1 INFO PING NIX 1.75(Very Low) (None) 3 
(Medium)

















6 Exploit MS_SQL DOS 
ATTEMPT (08)






7 NETBIOS NT NULL 
Session














10 RPC PORTMAP SADMIND 
REQUEST UDP




11 RPC SADMIND Query with 
root credentials
11.33 (Medium) 0 (None) 2 (Low)




































































Table 9: Analysis of the Response Costs for the First Attack Scenario
S/N Incident Response N-SIM (USD) CVSS (USD) Snort (USD)
Avoid 0 40 0
Transfer 0 0 0
Mitigate 20 0 20




Cost 20 40 20
Avoid 0 40 0
Transfer 0 0 0
Mitigate 0 0 20
Accept 10 0 0




Cost 10 40 20
Avoid 0 40 0
Transfer 0 0 0
Mitigate 20 0 20
Accept 0 0 0




Cost 20 40 20
Avoid 0 40 0
Transfer 0 0 0
Mitigate 20 0 20
Accept 0 0 0
4 Current_events 
landing page with 
malicious Java 
Applet 
Cost 20 40 20
Avoid 0 40 0
Transfer 0 0 0
Mitigate 20 0 20




Cost 20 40 20
Avoid 0 40 0
Transfer 0 0 0
Mitigate 20 0 20
Accept 0 0 0




Cost 20 40 20
Total Response Cost 110 240 120
































































Table 10: Analysis of the Response Costs for the Second Attack Scenario
S/N Incident Response N-SIM (USD) CVSS (USD) Snort (USD)
Avoid 0 40 0
Transfer 0 0 0
Mitigate 0 0 30
Accept 10 0 0
1 INFO PING NIX
Cost 10 40 30
Avoid 0 40 0
Transfer 0 0 0
Mitigate 0 0 30
Accept 10 0 0
2 INFO PING BSD 
type
Cost 10 40 30
Avoid 0 40 0
Transfer 0 0 0
Mitigate 0 0 30
Accept 10 0 0
3 INFO PING NIX
Cost 10 40 30
Avoid 0 40 0
Transfer 0 0 30
Mitigate 0 0 0
Accept 10 0 0
4 INFO PING BSD 
type
Cost 10 40 30
Avoid 0 40 0
Transfer 0 0 0
Mitigate 0 0 20
Accept 10 0 0
5 POLICY PE 
EXE/DLL Windows 
File Download
Cost 10 40 20
Avoid 0 0 0
Transfer 30 30 0
Mitigate 0 0 0
Accept 0 0 10
6 Exploit MS_SQL 
DOS ATTEMPT 
(08)
Cost 30 30 10
Avoid 0 40 0
Transfer 0 0 0
Mitigate 0 0 20
Accept 10 0 0
7 NETBIOS NT 
NULL Session
Cost 10 40 20
Avoid 0 40 0
Transfer 30 0 0
Mitigate 0 0 20
Accept 0 0 0
8 NETBIOS NT 
NULL Session
Cost 30 40 20
Avoid 0 40 0
Transfer 0 0 0
9 SNMP Public 
Access UDP
Mitigate 20 0 20
































































Accept 0 0 0
Cost 20 40 20
Avoid 40 40 0
Transfer 0 0 0
Mitigate 0 0 20
Accept 0 0 0
10 RPC PORTMAP 
SADMIND 
REQUEST UDP
Cost 40 40 20
Avoid 0 40 0
Transfer 30 0 0
Mitigate 0 0 20
Accept 0 0 0
11 RPC SADMIND 
Query with root 
credentials
Cost 30 40 40
Avoid 0 40 0
Transfer 0 0 30
Mitigate 0 0 0
Accept 10 0 0
12 ICMP PING NIX
Cost 10 40 30
Total Response Cost 220 470 300
































































Table 9: Performance Comparison Chart for National Cybersecurity Incident Management 
Set-ups
Evaluation Factors Proposed 
Collaborative 
Approach




Is there a Synergy among the ICT 
players?
Yes Yes Yes
Is there a measure to ensure data 
trust?
Yes Yes Yes
Does the trust capture the reputation 
of the incident?
Yes No Yes
Are standard guidelines and tools 
used?
Yes Yes Yes
Are the analysis models in-depth? Yes Yes No
Does the analysis support divergent 
incident views?
Yes Not reported Yes
Is any case study presented? Yes Yes Yes
Is the scenario evaluated? Yes No Yes
Are there rules of control? Yes Yes Yes
How many regulators are supported? Multiple Single Single
If regulators are multiple, is there a 
measure to ensure synergy?
Yes  -  -
If regulators are multiple, is there a 
measure to ensure resolve conflict?
Yes -  -
Does the architecture support 
review?
Yes Yes Yes
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